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THE NIGERIAN AIR FORCE TEN-YEAR STRATEGIC PLAN (2017 - 2026)

DECEMBER 2016

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FOREWORD

1. *The increasing trend of conflicts and disasters around the world, will necessitate Armed Forces to act singularly or in concert with other services to preserve security and promote stability in their respective nation states. Inevitably, the Armed Forces of Nigeria has, and will continue to play key role in confronting the full range of current and future challenges that the international and domestic operational environments will present. With the emergence of terrorism and militancy in Nigeria's security scenario, the conduct of high intensity counter insurgency operations in the North East and other internal security operations in other parts of the country became expedient for the NAF to play a meaningful role in ensuring the stability of the country. A thorough analysis of the current and likely future threats and operating environment must be undertaken to enhance the conduct of contemporary air operations. This will shape our thinking on the strategic direction for air power as we move towards achieving the much desired security, peace and favourable environment for development in our country.*

2. *The importance of maintaining a balanced air force that is both able to conduct operations across the spectrum of conflict and contribute to national defence and security is therefore paramount. The NAF must be prepared to effectively take independent action and support Joint Operations with the other Services when situation demands. Therefore, maintaining, equipping and*

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operating an effective Air Force is a prerequisite for effective response to current and future security challenges.

3. In line with the foregoing, the NAF undertakes periodic reviews of its strategic plan in order to harmonise its airpower capability and readiness against the prevailing threats and contingencies. The review also takes cognisance of the political and military strategic directives. Consequently, the NAF Ten-Year Strategic Plan 2017 - 2026 would present a road map for the evaluation of NAF's airpower capabilities in the next 10 years. The plan assesses the operating environment, while recognising the geo-political and geo-strategic environments as influenced by globalisation and internationalisation of security threats.

4. As contemporary national security architecture tends to shift from state centric to human centric, the Armed Forces of Nigeria and indeed the NAF becomes more engaged in internal security operations. The NAF concept of operations would therefore require appropriate mix of platforms, equipment and personnel in various specialties to meet stated objectives. These are the concerns this Strategic Plan is aimed at addressing.

Dec 16

SB ABUBAKAR
Air Marshal
Chief of the Air Staff

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1. *Global security in the post-Cold War era has been characterised by instability occasioned by terrorism, climate change, food shortages, human trafficking, arms proliferation, unemployment and others. These threats have necessitated a paradigm shift from the traditional security concept of the realist school of thought to the idealist school of human security. Consequently, the traditional role of the military in defending the territorial integrity of their respective nations against external aggression has shifted significantly to internal security operations. Buttressing this point, Mahbub-ul-Haq asserted that “ordinary human beings want security from threats of disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, political repression and environmental hazards”.¹ In the case of Nigeria, ethnic tension and the failure to respect differing ethnic, religious and cultural values, demographic pressures especially negative impact of population explosion and environmental degradation have become issues of security concern.*

2. *A nation’s security environment determines her level of prosperity and development. Nations draw up their security/defence policy and strategies to address current and foreseeable security challenges, risks and threats in consonance with their values and interests. This usually follows a thorough analysis of the international and domestic environments. Future projections through periodic strategic planning facilitate the process of specifying force*

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*structures and defence plans to address potential challenges and threats as necessary. Joseph Stalin observed that “**In military affairs, especially in contemporary war, one cannot stand in one place; to remain [static], means to fall behind; and those who fall behind, as is well known, are killed**”.*² This statement alludes to the importance of strategic planning in the military without which it would be difficult to meet future security imperatives. This is because the solutions to yesterday’s problems easily become ineffective in addressing the complex ones of today and the sophisticated ones of tomorrow.

3. The 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as Amended) provides for the establishment of the Armed Forces of Nigeria (AFN). It states that they shall be adequately equipped and maintained for the purpose of effectively defending Nigeria from external aggression, maintaining its territorial integrity, suppressing insurrection and performing such other functions as may be prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly³. The Armed Forces Act, CAP. A20 LFN 2004 in Part 1 (4, b) further charged the Nigerian Air Force (NAF) to enforce and assist in coordinating the enforcement of international laws, conventions, practices and customs ascribed or acceded to by Nigeria relating to aerial or space activities in the Nigerian air space. NAF responsibilities also include delineating, demarcating and coordinating of all aerial surveys and security zones of the Nigerian air space.⁴

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4. *Nigeria has been contending with various threats to her national security. This includes the Boko Haram insurgency in the North-East, militancy and vandalism of oil and gas infrastructure in the Niger Delta, piracy as well as oil theft in the Gulf of Guinea. Other areas of concern include trans-national crimes such as arms, drug and human trafficking amongst others. The NAF in fulfilment of its constitutional responsibilities has been involved in efforts aimed at addressing these threats using its expertise and unique competencies. In preparing for these contingencies the NAF has always been forward looking in line with the view of Sanu Kainikara who asserted **“It is imperative for air forces to understand their nation’s security environment and position themselves to provide the government with multiple response options to emerging crisis. This is especially critical for air forces that are limited by resources to be self-sufficient - to operate at the required level and for the duration necessary - across the spectrum of conflict. Otherwise, they face the real threat of strategic oblivion”**.⁵ To this end, the NAF prepares Ten-Yearly Strategic Plans which provide general guidance on the development of the Service to meet security imperatives. These plans are along guidelines provided by national policies such as the National Defence Policy (2006), National Security Strategy (2014), National Counter Terrorism Strategy (2016, Revised), Terrorism Act (2011) as well as National Cyber Security Policy and Strategy (2014). The last in the series was the updated Ten-Year Strategic Plan for the NAF covering the period 2010 - 2020.*

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5. *Though the 2010 - 2020 Strategic Plan was not due for review until 2020, however, recent development in the local scene such as the seemingly endless Boko Haram and Niger Delta militant activities amongst others have necessitate a review. This review sets to prepare the NAF to confront emerging and envisaged challenges from 2017 till 2026.*

6. *The 2017 - 2026 Strategic Plan will examine the geo-strategic environment towards identifying the security challenges that are likely to confront Nigeria in the next 10 years. Flowing from this, air strategies the NAF will require to adopt will be enumerated. Airpower capabilities required to execute the air strategies will be derived. Platforms, personnel and support equipment needed to attain the identified airpower capabilities will be calculated with shortfalls indicated. Finally, the implementation plan will be outlined. To aid in implementation, estimated cost of obtaining the identified airpower capabilities will be enumerated.*

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CHAPTER 2

OPERATING ENVIRONMENT

7. *Nigeria is located in West Africa and it shares land borders with the Republic of Benin in the west, Cameroon in the east, Niger in the north and Chad to the north east. Its coast lies on the Gulf of Guinea in the south. It has a land area of 923,768 sq km and coastline of 853 km.⁶ Nigeria is home to over 250 ethnic groups with different languages and cultures. According to the National Population Commission, as at 31 October 2016, the population of Nigeria was estimated at 182 million persons with a population growth rate of 3.2 percent.⁷ This makes her the seventh most populous nation in the world and by 2021, the population is projected to reach 210 million people.*

8. *The National Bureau of Statistics stated that the national unemployment rate stood at 13.3 per cent in the second quarter of 2016 thus accounting for a total of 26.06 million persons in the Nigerian labour force that were either unemployed or underemployed. The inflation rate as at September 2016 was 17.9 per cent and this reflected in higher prices of essential commodities.⁸ The consequent reduction in the purchasing power priority of the general population has some negative security implications for the country. The population, size, natural endowment and vibrancy of Nigerians coupled with her bold foreign policy stance make her noticeable in the international community. Consequently, she elicits reaction from the external environment.*

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EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT

9. *France and Great Britain have economic and cultural ties with countries of West Africa that dates back to the colonial era. While France still maintains a broad range of trade, diplomatic, political and defence ties with her former colonies, Britain, apart from trade and diplomatic ties, maintains minimal military cooperation with her former colonies. It was probably in this regard that France became involved in the diplomatic efforts to resolve the Boko Haram insurgency that has plagued Nigeria and her French-speaking neighbours. France relationship with her former colonies is expected to continue along these lines. Thus, Nigeria needs to factor this into her defence planning.*

10. *The pursuit of energy and economic interests has brought the US and China amongst others to the Gulf of Guinea. The USA's growing interests in the region reflected in her formation of the Africa Command (AFRICOM). She has also established a base for Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) in Niger Republic with a view to enhancing her operations in the region. Similarly, search for raw materials and oil for her industries as well as markets for her goods has informed a shift in focus of China's relationship with African countries from ideological considerations to trade centred engagements. The Peoples Republic of China is the world's second largest consumer of oil after the USA and its consumption is expected to double by 2025.⁹ Apart from various bilateral economic relationships with Nigeria, especially in the construction and technological spheres, her oil imports makes her a strategic partner to Nigeria.*

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China equally has trade relationships with both Cameroon and Niger Republic. The interests of these 2 powerful nations could be viewed from both developmental and security perspectives. Conscious efforts must be made to ensure the security implications of their interests are understood and addressed.

11. Nigeria is involved in an economic protocol with Sao Tome and Principe in the Joint Development Zone located in our common EEZ. She is also into a protocol known as the Niger Basin Commission (NBC) with Niger Republic on use of the River Niger. Though the tenets of these agreements are being honoured, any future disagreements may be a possible source of conflicts that could challenge national security. Similarly, border dispute with Cameroon over the oil-rich Bakassi Peninsula was addressed by International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague in 2002. Consequently, Nigeria formally ceded Bakassi to Cameroon on 14 August 2008.¹⁰ This is however being contested within some quarters in Nigeria which may pose some security challenge in the future. Other potential security challenges include the discovery of diamond in commercial quantities in Nigeria's border with Niger Republic and our new drive for exploration of oil in the Lake Chad Basin.

12. Climate change has accelerated desertification which is more pronounced in our northern neighbouring countries and the northern part of Nigeria. This situation is resulting in mass migration of peoples and their pastoral southwards

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in search of food and water. In the past, these migrations were mostly peaceful but recently they have become associated with skirmishes, thus creating security challenges that might involve Nigerian military intervention.

13. *Nigeria has over 4,000 square kilometres of land borders with 114 approved control posts. However, there are over 1,400 illegal routes which are not manned. The porous borders have contributed immensely to small arms and light weapons proliferation. The availability of these weapons has enabled militant and criminal groups to have easy access to arms. Indeed Nigeria is estimated to host over 70 per cent of about 8 million illegal weapons in West Africa.¹¹ All these issues have grave security implications for the country.*

14. *Globalization as a phenomenon has broken down barriers between nations, thus integrating economies and people. However, it also comes with its vulnerabilities, resulting in shocks and disruptions to the economic system. The clearest manifestation of globalization is 'shrinking of time', space and the apparent disappearance of borders. The shrinking of time and space manifest in the speed with which information is transmitted and how developments in one part of the world affects others in places remote from the point of action. By implication, it also explains the ineffectiveness of physical borders in the transmission of ideas and activities. The interconnectedness of the world means that governments have seemingly lost part of their sovereignty over their population. This has implications for governments around the world in ensuring*

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that the negative effects of globalisation do not affect the survival of their nations.

15. In spite of the unstable outlook of the external environment, in the period under review, it is unlikely the NAF would be called upon to conduct operations in a full scale war with another nation state. Notwithstanding this, the NAF still needs to be prepared to perform her constitutional role in defence of Nigeria against acts that undermine her sovereignty.

INTERNAL ENVIRONMENT

16. It is worthy of note that ethnic pressure groups and militias have found voice in the Nigerian polity. Some of these groups include the Bakassi Boys, O'dua People's Congress (OPC), Arewa People's Congress, Movement for the Actualization of Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), Niger Delta Congress, Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (Boko Haram Islamic Sect). These ethnic pressure groups or militias fight perceived social injustices, fear of domination, marginalization and political exclusion or other causes. The activities of these groups have impacted negatively on the social interaction of the populace thus creating security tension to which the military have been called to contain.

17. Revolution in ICT which heralded the entry of smart phones, internet, computers, radio, television and other ICT dependent services like banks, social media and transportation industry have simplified communication

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network for exchange of goods and services. However, malware authors and cyber-criminals can disrupt activities of governments and institutions to create disharmony. Similarly, cyber espionage network can gain access to national or business confidential information for criminal intent. These threats could be external or internal. Terror groups have also used these technologies in furtherance of their activities. It is on record that information gained through ICT has aided criminal non-state actors and radical Islamist fundamentalists in the fabrication of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). Boko Haram members are known to have exploited ICT to make contacts with other terror groups world wide. Nigeria, being a consumer of ICT products faces threats of cyber crime/war which portends grave danger for the country's security if left unchecked. Their activities are also capable of downgrading the effectiveness of the NAF.

18. *Over 30 per cent of Nigeria's population fall within the youth bracket that can be deployed for national development. However, over 22.45 million of them are either unemployed or underemployed making them susceptible to manipulation and recruitment by dissidents or criminal gangs. Similarly, kidnapping in Nigeria has assumed prominence with ransoms being demanded and collected by criminal gangs for the release of abductees. The causes of these activities are traceable to unemployment, greed, political hooliganism, corruption, poverty and religious extremism. Most of the miscreants involved in*

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these activities are youths. This situation therefore has turned the youth bulge phenomenon into a security concern for the country.

19. *Terrorism is one of the main sources of insecurity in Nigeria today and its base of support has generally been located in religious fanaticism and intolerance. Nigeria has lost thousands of lives owing to this insecurity. The linkage of Boko Haram to international terrorist organisations such as Al Qaeda, ISIS and others is a source of concern to Nigeria. Although their activities are being contained, their spread across Nigerian borders into Cameroon, Chad and Niger makes them a formidable terror group. Their presence in any parts of these countries would continue to pose grave danger to Nigeria's security.*

20. *In summary, internal security environment in Nigeria has been characterised by communal clashes, threats of secession, political killings, kidnappings and general sense of insecurity. These challenges are fuelled by perceived marginalization of minorities by major tribes, unequal access to national resources and wealth as well as religious intolerance. These no doubt have consequences for national security that could require NAF intervention.*

FUTURE TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL SECURITY

21. *A review of present and past events provides a basis for planning future expected events. The intention is not to seek to predict the future but provide a framework for planning possible future events and their implications to the country's security. According to Alan Lakein, "failing to plan is planning to*

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fail”.¹² No one can predict the future with certainty, but the key to responding positively to the fluidity of the global security environment is vision centred strategic planning. With globalization, national and international security impact on each other due to the interdependency of the economy of nations. For instance, the United Nations (UN) raised alarm over the proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) in Nigeria. It observed that the illicit weapons have had a dramatic impact on peace and security in the country, threatening not only the existence of the state, but also the livelihoods of millions of people across the continent. This situation if left unchecked, will not only jeopardise the developmental gains achieved over the years, but will also impede the nation’s capacity to achieve its developmental targets. The capacity of the various agencies including the NAF, responsible for controlling the proliferation of weapons would need to be enhanced.

22. A key development Nigeria needs to keep an eye on is the seemingly ultra nationalist drive in the western world. This is occasioned by the United Kingdom (UK) voting to leave the European Union (Brexit) and the result of the 2016 USA Presidential Election. Nigerians should be worried about the negative impacts of these events. It is likely that immigrants would expect tougher times as a fall out of these political developments. One of the reason given for the Brexit was that many of the problems plaguing the UK in recent times were due to immigrants. Some British citizens blame immigrants for increasing unemployment, crime and various econometric issues.¹³ These

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countries are expected to become more nationalistic in their dealings with immigrants. A lot of Nigerians live in the USA and UK as immigrants hence in future, measures taken to address these vexing issues of migrants may result in several Nigerians being deported thus worsening the unemployment situation at home, reducing remittances and increasing the potentials for internal conflict.

23. There are growing influence of China and other emerging powers in the continent of Africa. Some of the factors that have contributed to this is the increasing investment in infrastructure and development as well as the low cost of products being dumped in the African markets.¹⁴ While the investment of China is welcomed in the area of infrastructure development and military cooperation, encouraging China to invest in manufacturing industries in Nigeria rather than exporting their products would help in improving the unemployment climate. This is more so that the Chinese take advantage of their low cost of production which in turn enables them to export cheaper goods thus dominating the market in developing countries like Nigeria. The effect of this is closure of production lines in such countries. The resulting unemployment has implications for national security.

24. In the field of ICT, threats to protected systems will most likely not fade away in the nearest future. The attacks on such systems will be more professional and more narrowly targeted against critical institutions. Hacking into information systems can be used to gain intelligence and disrupt military

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operations. The technology scene will be more complex, diverse, potent and pervasive.¹⁵ Thus, while efforts are made to improve ICT facilities and systems to cope with modern day operations, communications and data protection would require more aggressive measures to ensure seamless operations.

25. The ineffectiveness of the United Nations in ensuring global peace and security, occasioned by indiscriminate use of veto power has led nations to take unilateral military actions against other nations. Also, new power blocs are beginning to emerge in the international arena indicating the likelihood that hegemonic powers would erode giving way to a new world order. Power may likely shift to new networks and coalitions in a multipolar world order.¹⁶ This may have implications for Nigeria's foreign policy and security planning. In this regard, existing military alliances and cooperation involving Nigeria may be affected. One of the consequences is the country being denied access to defence equipment by foreign manufacturers. Nigeria must therefore shore up her Military Industrial Complex to enable her withstand the shocks of the new order, while in the interim, the armed forces must explore alternate sources for her defence needs.

26. Global warming and the resultant climate change will likely continue to manifest in several consequences. This may include resource scarcity, sea-level rise and intensification of natural disasters. These will have major effects on the environment such as flooding, soil erosion in coastal areas and

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landslides that may result in food security concerns and displacement of people.¹⁷ These may require the intervention of the Armed Forces in disaster relief operations.

27. Incidences of violent crimes such as armed robbery and kidnapping occasioned by rising unemployment and economic hardships are likely to remain high in the foreseeable future. Therefore, establishment of joint military/police task forces in most states of the Federation may continue in order to checkmate the resulting vices.

28. As sources of instability proliferate on a global scale, the future promises to be equally unpredictable. Security analysis reveals the spread of religious extremism and terrorism as potential catalysts for unrest. Notwithstanding, the traditional causes of conflict such as political and economic instability as well as competition for natural resources will remain major issues for future attention.¹⁸ Therefore, the NAF would need to periodically review its operating environment with a view to determining the air strategies required to meet emerging security threats. Consequently, in the next 10 years, the NAF would be required to derive air strategies for counter insurgency, protection of critical national assets, maritime resources, and national border. Others will include protection against external aggression and aid to civil power/authority. The NAF must also be prepared to participate in operations in fulfilment of Nigeria's international security obligations.

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CHAPTER 3

AIR STRATEGY

29. *Having analysed the environment in which the NAF is likely to operate in the next 10 years, this Chapter will articulate the air power tasks, responses and strategies required to address the identified threats. Accordingly, the types and number of platforms required to enable the NAF attain the required capabilities will be derived.*

AIR POWER RESPONSES AND PLATFORMS REQUIRED

30. *The future will demand a technically capable and balanced air force that provides assured effect for defence, founded on the enduring key air power roles.¹⁹ These roles will continue to be relevant in the conduct of air operations. Accordingly, the air power responses detailed in the subsequent paragraphs would require an array of air power capabilities to manage. These capabilities were derived after careful analysis of the various threats to Nigeria's national security and the experiences of the NAF in past operations.*

PROTECTION AGAINST EXTERNAL AGGRESSION

31. *The NAF Act 1964 tasked her to defend the territorial integrity of Nigeria by air. This presupposes that in the event of war, the NAF would employ air power assets to deny adversaries freedom of operation in the air and provide support to surface forces. This may also entail pre-emptive air strikes against the adversaries, vital military installations or economic assets considered of*

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military value. Consequently, the NAF would need capabilities in the following areas:

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COUNTER INSURGENCY

32. *The NAF is active in the counter insurgency operations currently being conducted in the North East. Suffice to add that NAF's efforts have been instrumental in degrading the capability of the insurgents to the level whereby their effectiveness is continually being diminished. Nevertheless, the NAF should continue with the present efforts and be prepared to counter possible future insurgency from any part of the country. Therefore, the NAF would require the following capabilities:*

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PROTECTION OF CRITICAL NATIONAL ASSETS

33. *The NAF could be called upon to conduct operations geared towards protecting critical infrastructure and national assets. It may also include protection of pipelines, dams, power lines, airports and other government installations. These may involve combat operations to free these assets from seizure by renegades. The capabilities required by the NAF to achieve these objectives include the following:*

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Detailed at Annex A are the requisite platforms to meet these air capabilities.

PROTECTION OF MARITIME RESOURCES

34. *The air power response for protecting maritime resources could be through airborne surveillance of the nation's maritime environment as well as provision of intelligence to surface forces which could be conducted day and*

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night. It would encompass operations against piracy and illegal oil bunkering where identified adversaries could be intercepted from the air. However, these activities could sometimes be far from shore and out of the combat radius of conventional shore based combat platforms. Hence, it will be necessary for the MPAs to possess anti-shipping capabilities. Additionally, favourable air situation could be provided for surface forces. To this effect, the capabilities required include:

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BORDER PROTECTION

35. *The NAF may be required to conduct operations in liaison with other agencies to protect Nigeria's porous borders in order to mitigate cross border crimes such as drug trafficking, armed banditry as well as arms and human trafficking. The following air power capabilities would be required to meet these challenges:*

- a. *ISR.*
- b. *Heliborne Operations.*

Platforms to meet these capabilities are at Annex A.

AID TO CIVIL POWER/AUTHORITY

36. *The NAF could be called upon to undertake roles in aid to civil power /authority (MACP and MACA) covering a wide range of activities. Some of the functions may include provision of assistance in the event of natural disasters/emergencies, conduct of psychological air operations, provision of medical services to displaced persons, air transportation of relief materials, VIP movements, transportation of vital materials. In the case of aid to civil power, the NAF may be involved in combating terrorism, militancy and suppressing communal clashes amongst others in support of the Nigeria police, Nigeria Security and Defence Corps (NSCDC) or other agencies. In this regard the NAF would be required to possess the following capabilities:*

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INTERNATIONAL SECURITY OBLIGATIONS

37. International security obligations entail regional and global security commitments Nigeria may enter into from time to time. This may require the NAF to deploy either singly or in support of sister Services to perform operations in line with the Federal Government of Nigeria undertakings. Additionally, in line with Article 7 of the UN Charter the NAF may be called upon to participate in peace enforcement operations outside the shores of the country. Some other areas the NAF could be involved include deployment of troops to operational areas, replenishment or rotation of own troops, airlift of relief materials and evacuation of stranded Nigerians from conflict/disaster areas. The air power capabilities required for these obligations are as follow:

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RATIONALISED OPERATIONAL PLATFORM REQUIREMENTS

38. Calculations of operational platforms required is predicated on the experiences gained from campaigns such as ECOMOG Operation, Operations RESTORE HOPE, LAFIYA DOLE, DELTA SAFE and the Joint Task Force operations in the North East. Aircraft and aircrew availability, mission request, mission accomplishment, communications and ISR were also considered. Furthermore, where missions overlap, advantage of the flexibility of airpower was exploited. To avoid duplication of effort, the platforms derived at Annex A are rationalised in Table 1 below. The table summarises the platforms required for operations up to 2026.

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TRAINING PLATFORMS REQUIREMENTS

39. *The anticipated induction of Super Mushshack aircraft would strengthen the primary training platform while the Diamond aircraft could be re-rolled for transport training. Similarly, the L-39ZA need to be refurbished with glass cockpit upgrade, ejection seat and upgraded engine. The DO-228 could continue to be utilised as multi engine transport trainer until replaced, while A-109 LUH functions as an induction ac for helicopter pilots. The proposed training platforms are as detailed in Table 2 below:*

TABLE 2: TRAINING PLATFORMS REQUIREMENTS

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TOTAL PLATFORMS REQUIREMENTS

40. The total platforms required by the NAF up to 2026 as detailed in Table 3 below is derived from both the operational and training platforms tables above. The table also determines the total platform deficiencies in the NAF. In deriving this, cognisance was taken of existing platforms in NAF inventory. Furthermore, it brought to fore, some platforms that are seemingly available but are inoperable. These platforms, indicated as unserviceable in the remark column would need to be reactivated where possible or decision taken towards their replacement. In this category are the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] in NAF inventory but in reality have been inactive for an extended period and could be categorised as BER. The ac in the deficiency column would therefore need to be acquired in phases by the Service in a 10-year induction process. Details of cost implication for the platforms are at Annex B.

TABLE 3: TOTAL PLATFORMS REQUIREMENTS

[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

41. Having determined the total number of platforms required to meet envisaged threats up to the year 2026, there is need to examine the facilities and services to support the platforms.

CHAPTER 4

OPERATIONAL SUPPORT FACILITIES AND SERVICES

42. *The projected platforms required to meet the national security challenges envisaged for the period 2017 - 2026 will require a robust operational and logistics support arrangements. In the past, poor state of these facilities and infrastructure has had negative consequences on NAF operations. However, recent efforts at revamping some of these facilities have started yielding positive results. Notwithstanding, there is need to appraise the state of these facilities to enhance optimum performance in line with the projections of this Strategic Plan. Consequently, the major components of the support facilities and infrastructure are assessed in the succeeding paragraphs.*

RUNWAYS AND TAXIWAYS

43. *The NAF operates either from joint (military/civil) user airfields or single (military) user airfields. The military runways are located in [REDACTED]. Over time these runways and associated taxiways have deteriorated, prompting the NAF to establish a Rapid Runway Repair Team (RRRT) responsible for their repairs and maintenance to make them usable. The newly established bases like Bauchi and Owerri would require construction of taxiways, aprons and associated facilities as they are in joint user airfields.*

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NAVIGATIONAL AIDS

44. The 4 military airfields at [REDACTED] are not adequately served with nav aids. [REDACTED] has a CVOR and PAPI but the PAPI remains un calibrated, the runway lightings require reactivation. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] has an NDB and no runway lightings. [REDACTED] also has CVOR/DME and serviceable runway lightings while Kaduna has VOR/DME although the DME aspect is not calibrated. Runway lightings for the Kaduna airfield are being installed. None of the [REDACTED] airfields has functional ILS. Details of the upgrades required and their cost implications are at Annex C.

AIR INTELLIGENCE EQUIPMENT

45. Accurate intelligence is a necessary tool for victory in any air campaign. It supports the manoeuvre, security and the economy of combat forces to achieve their objectives. The NAF's growing involvement in counter insurgency operations places it more in need of intelligence. For the Directorate of Air Intelligence to meet this need, it would need to meet its manpower and specialised training requirements and also be appropriately equipped. Hence, the Directorate requires a Geographic Information System (GIS) laboratory to enable it generate accurate coordinates of desired targets to aid precision and surgical strikes.

46. The imagery interpretation laboratory of the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] needs to be equipped with modern imagery analysis hardware and

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software tools. This will empower the DAI with the capacity to analyse ISR images in support of air operations. Furthermore, satellite-linked airspace monitoring equipment project conceived for the 015 SIG needs to be completed to place the Directorate in a position to defensively monitor the Nigerian airspace. The estimated cost of acquiring these equipment is [REDACTED]

AIR TRAFFIC SERVICES

47. All NAF military airfields have organic control towers and associated equipment installed. Most of the equipment in the control towers were installed over 20 years ago as such are not only old but also obsolete and subject to regular break down. There is therefore the need to upgrade the equipment so as to provide full compliment of ground to air and ground-to-ground communication. Additionally, the control tower unit at Port Harcourt would require rehabilitation.

48. The NAF is sometimes required to operate from un-established bases or unprepared surfaces. Conducting operations from such bases have been challenging because of inadequate mobile forward operations support facilities. To overcome this challenge, it is proposed that the NAF should acquire 4 units of the Heliman type Forward Operations Support (FOS) vehicles incorporating an integrated tower cabin. Each of the FOS vehicles is estimated to cost [REDACTED]

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49. Meteorological equipment are practically non-existent in all the NAF units as they are all obsolete and utterly degraded. The NAF currently relies on interpolated data received from civil meteorological forecasters to estimate critical weather indicators required for NAF operations. This situation is inimical to safe air operations. The NAF would need to re-equip its meteorological units. It is estimated that a standard meteorological unit will cost [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

RADAR

50. The NAF currently has [REDACTED] units of the 36D6 Mobile Radars located at [REDACTED]. However, the Radars are not equipped with IFF. Hence, their effectiveness in detecting hostile flying objects is limited. It is therefore essential that the IFF components be acquired to remedy this shortcoming. This will cost [REDACTED] each. The two radar systems are also inadequate to provide total coverage of own airspace. The ultimate solution would be to implement the military component of the total radar coverage of Nigeria (TRACON) project. However, given the huge cost that would be required to execute the project, it is recommended that it be broken into phases. The first phase could entail integrating the 2 x 36D6 Radars with Civil TRACON and providing a central operations control centre preferably in Abuja. The integration of the Civil TRACON and the 2 x 36D6 Radars is

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expected to cost about [REDACTED]
required for the 2 IFF components. Details are at Annex C.

FIRE TENDERS

51. Most NAF units have at least a fire tender each, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]. Although the
situation is slightly better for operational units, they also struggle to ensure that
fire tenders remained serviceable. The general picture in most NAF units is that
fire tenders are inadequate for the infrastructure they are expected to cover.
Although there is an ongoing refurbishment exercise which is expected to bring
more fire tenders on line, there is however the need for a gradual regeneration
plan for the NAF fire tenders to replace vehicles that have degenerated
considerably due to old age. To this end, it is proposed that the NAF should
plan to acquire at least 24 Mercedes Benz fire tenders and 15 IFEX fire fighting
vehicles over the next ten years. The estimated unit cost of the Mercedes Benz
type fire tender is [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

HANGAR FACILITIES

52. The NAF has 3 large hangars located at [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] while it has 5 medium hangars located at [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. There is also an uncompleted hangar at 303 MAG Ilorin. The workshops and test benches in some of these hangars have deteriorated over the years to the extent that it is difficult to carry out effective maintenance. While the facilities in the hangar would need rehabilitation, the workshops require major upgrade of their test benches in order to effectively support aircraft operations. Forklifts, dust blowers, industrial weighing scales, jacks, air compressors, warehouse ladders, HIAP Crane etc would be required for most of these hangars. This is more so that air operations are expected to intensify. Detailed at Annex D are the required hangar equipment and their cost.

BULK FUEL INSTALLATIONS

53. Bulk Fuel Installations (BFIs) are available in NAF bases at [REDACTED]. However, some operational NAF bases lack this facility. BFIs are important for contingency stocks in case of disruption to normal supplies. The increased air operations due to the ongoing North East and Niger Delta operations coupled with the prevalent scarcity of aviation fuel lay credence to the need for BFIs at all NAF operational bases to forestall disruptions to air operations. There is therefore, the need to install BFIs at Ilorin and Bauchi. Bowsers are required to complement the BFIs to ensure seamless flow of fuel for air operations. It could also serve as mobile storage facilities for un-established bases. Some

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operational bases have either unserviceable or inadequate Browsers. Detailed at Annex E are BFI and Browser requirements.

COMMUNICATIONS

54. Communication is germane to every military operation both in peace and war time. Over the years, the NAF has invested in different categories of communications equipment varying from ground to ground, air band and surveillance. Efforts are on-going to emplace a robust communication network for the Service. To this end, new communications equipment for Broadband access, ISR mission system, HF base radio etc are gradually being installed for NAF units. These installations should however be extended to units that are yet to benefit from such equipment. The detailed communications requirement and cost implications are at Annex F.

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY

55. Information technology (IT) drives modern day military operations and provides an avenue for speedy exchange of information. It also enhances surveillance, documentation, video conferences, aircraft tracking systems, base defence and cyber security. These products are gradually being deployed in the NAF to enhance security of personnel and equipment. Tele-presence equipment is already installed at [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] There is need to evolve policy on IT to strengthen its utilisation in management, offensive and

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defensive domains. Detailed IT requirements and cost implications are at Annex G.

SPACE TECHNOLOGY

56. Space Technology is a relatively new specialty in the NAF and therefore still evolving. Nigeria has 3 functional satellites in space to aid communications and provision of SATCOM on various ISR platforms, internet connectivity and other communications needs of the NAF. The NAF can leverage on the Defence Space Agency (DSA) and the National Space Research and Development Agency (NARSDA) to derive necessary information that could enhance NAF operations. The construction of a GIS laboratory for geo-spatial intelligence and a Network Operating Centre will be necessary to further enhance air operations.

ARMAMENT

57. [REDACTED]. This has always been inadequate to store NAF bombs and missiles necessitating the resort to the use Nigerian Army (NA) storage facilities. The NA depots [REDACTED] for storing aircraft bombs. This is further complicated by the ongoing operations in the NE resulting in increased demand for bombs and missiles which require more storage space. It is therefore imperative to construct new armament depots for the NAF. A plan to construct another armament depot for the NAF at [REDACTED] in the past has not received budgetary approval. The plan was designed

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to accommodate a holding of [REDACTED] bombs, in [REDACTED] per building. The cost of constructing the depot is estimated at [REDACTED]. However, the project could be scaled down and completed in phases. Meanwhile, the sum of [REDACTED] would be needed for the construction of demolition bunkers and storage facilities in [REDACTED]. These will also accommodate small arms and light weapons that are expected to increase due to the new force protection concept and the establishment of Special Operations Command (SOC). Details of the cost for the construction of the armament depot and armament requirement are at Annex H.

FORCE PROTECTION

58. The establishment of the SOC institutes the actualisation of the concept of force protection in the NAF. The concept seeks to relieve all other specialties from force protection duties to enable them concentrate on their primary responsibilities. SOC through its 9 Groups spread across the country will serve as the ground combat arm of the NAF. It would respond to the demands of the changing security environment by protecting all NAF assets and personnel in all units. To this effect, the NAF has acquired some Honker multi-purpose combat vehicles, KPMG and other equipment. Notwithstanding these acquisitions, more specialised items would be required to enhance force protection. These include Ground Based Air Defence weapons, APCs and other

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equipment. Details of the equipment required to carry out these duties and their cost are at Annex I.

MEDICALS

59. To enhance operational effectiveness and morale of personnel, NAF Hospitals in [REDACTED] and other locations would need to be adequately equipped and upgraded to meet the required healthcare needs of all personnel and their families. Newly established bases would also need to be equipped with necessary medical facilities and personnel. Furthermore, NAF medical has been involved in medical outreach programmes targeted at IDPs and communities liberated from the insurgents in the NE operations. The medical outreach programmes have contributed to winning the hearts and minds of the locals in these communities. Details of the medical requirement and their associated costs are at Annex J.

BARRACK ACCOMMODATION

60. The NAF has adequately accommodated [REDACTED] personnel out of [REDACTED] personnel thus leaving a deficit of [REDACTED] accommodation of various categories. There are also about [REDACTED] offrs and [REDACTED] airmen/airwomen approved for lodging allowance. On completion of on-going barracks projects, a total of [REDACTED] personnel would further be accommodated. However, due to the anticipated expansion within the period under review, additional [REDACTED] offrs and [REDACTED] airmen/airwomen would require accommodation. More accommodation for offrs

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and airmen/airwomen would therefore be needed even as personnel separate from the Service. Barrack accommodation for personnel would not only enhance NAF operations, but will also provide for the safety of the personnel and their families as well as safe cost. The estimated cost of providing accommodation for the NAF up to 2026 is [REDACTED]

PERSONNEL KITTING

61. Provision of standard uniforms, accoutrements, kits, and type to trade kitting boost the morale of the personnel and operational effectiveness. To this end, the NAF provides all personnel with initial issue. While officers are responsible for the replacement of their uniform as necessary, the airmen/airwomen are re-issued uniforms and accoutrements periodically. Efforts must therefore be geared towards timely provision of these logistics items to ensure safety and smart turn out of all personnel. In this regard, NAF effort at sourcing uniforms and accoutrements locally is commendable. It has reduced dependence on imported items. The cost of providing uniforms, accoutrements and type to trade kitting for NAF personnel up to 2026 is estimated at [REDACTED]

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CHAPTER 5

FORCE STRUCTURE

62. *To meet the prevailing threat situation and its obligations to the country, the NAF is organized into a Service Headquarters and 6 field commands. The Headquarters consists of the Office of Chief of the Air Staff and 9 staff branches. The Branches are Policy and Plans; Training and Operations; Aircraft Engineering; Logistics and Communications; Administration Medical Services as well as Standards and Evaluation. Others include Accounts and Budgets, and the Air Secretary. They are responsible for policy formulation on issues pertaining to their functions.*

63. *The 6 field commands are the Tactical Air Command (TAC), Special Operations Command (SOC), Mobility Command (MC), Training Command (ATC) Ground Training Command (GTC) and Logistics Command (LC). The current NAF organizational structure is at Annex K. A critical analysis of the structure based on the ongoing efforts, envisaged future threat up to the year 2026 and the proposed platforms that would be inducted into the Service inform a review of the current force structure.*

HEADQUARTERS NIGERIAN AIR FORCE

64. **Log and Comms Branch.** *It is expected that there will be substantial increase in logistics, communications, IT and space related activities. Hence, for more responsive service delivery in the logistics and communications*

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specialties, the Logistics and Communications Branch is unbundled into 2 branches; Logistics Branch and Communications Branch.

65. **Medicals**. Considering that the NAF has ■ hospitals and ■ medical centres, the Medical Services were previously placed under Admin Branch is confronted with enlarged span of control. The Directorate is therefore upgraded to a branch. This will enhance prompt response to medical situations that normally would have taken long to resolve due to the bottleneck associated with the present disposition.

66. **Sports**. Sports in the NAF is almost reduced to only Wednesday activities, unlike in the past when NAF sportsmen/women used to win laurels for the country. The envisaged increase in personnel strength over the next 10 years and the establishment of SOC would necessitate the need for more sports personnel and better sports administration regime. The sports sub directorate is therefore upgraded to a directorate. This will enhance more effective control of sporting activities. Hence it will promote physical fitness amongst personnel.

67. **Chaplaincy/Imam**. The Chaplaincy/Imam sub directorate under the Directorate of Administration manages religious matter in the NAF. The envisaged increase in personnel strength within the period of this Strategic Plan would necessitate a full fledged directorate for religious affairs in view of expected enlarged worship facilities. The upgrade of Chaplaincy/Imam sub-

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directorate to the directorate of religious affairs will therefore, aid the smooth administration of worship centres in the Service.

68. **Legal.** *To facilitate smooth legal administration in the NAF, there is need to establish a centre in the form of Legal Resource Management Group. This will free the Directorate of Legal Services from the encumbrance of numerous NAF land matters and court cases. The centre will be responsible for legal representation, advice, contract administration and land matters involving the NAF. It would also serve as legal advisory centre to all personnel. The Centre should be centrally located for easy access by HQ NAF and personnel from all units.*

FIELD COMMANDS

69. *Training Command has become relatively enlarged overtime as new schools are established. The command has ■ schools and ■ other units, which has made its span of control to become too wide in terms of their diverse roles. The Command should be unbundled into 2 Commands; Air Training Command for aircrew training and Ground Training Command for other trades. All the flying training schools including air combat training schools at ■■■■■ will come under the Air Training Command while all ground training schools will be placed under the Ground Training Command.*

MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

70. *No organisation can thrive effectively without well-trained human*

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72. Table 5 determines that the NAF would require additional [REDACTED] pilots and [REDACTED] UAV operators to man the envisaged platforms by the year 2026. Meanwhile, a substantial number of the available [REDACTED] pilots are senior officers that are currently deployed for desk jobs at various HQ levels. Additionally, many of the pilots of wg cdr/gp capt rank bracket graduated from flying schools within the last one year has reduced years of operational availability. When viewed against the backdrop of the number of senior pilots that would separate from Service within the next 10 years, the [REDACTED] deficiency even if addressed would not meet NAF requirement. A [REDACTED] per cent increment is added to the pilot deficiency figure to compensate for separation from Service, courses and deployments to desk job to ensure adequate pilots are available to man the various platforms up to the year 2026. The NAF would therefore need to bring on line additional [REDACTED] pilots within the next 10 years. This will translate to producing an average of [REDACTED] pilots annually.

TABLE 5: PILOT DEFICIENCY

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74. The [REDACTED] currently trains with [REDACTED] and the school have capacity to graduate [REDACTED] students a year. The [REDACTED] has [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] IPs for the conduct of basic pilot training. It currently has capacity to train [REDACTED] SPs in [REDACTED] months which could be improved upon with more ac and IPs. Conversely, IHFS which is a joint venture between the NAF and a civilian partner, trains with [REDACTED] [REDACTED] helicopters and [REDACTED] IPs although [REDACTED] of these IPs are shared with [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] has capacity to train about [REDACTED] helicopter pilots annually. Clearly, if the schools are optimally utilised the NAF is capable of producing over [REDACTED] pilots annually.

75. This figure if augmented with flying training slots overseas or at other local flying schools as is currently being practised will surpass the target training of [REDACTED] pilots annually. Therefore, the training of [REDACTED] pilots for the NAF over a period of 10 years is realisable.

76. The NAF pilot training philosophy involves a primary flying training and basic flying training arrangement leading to the award of a pilot wing. All students for primary flying training are graduates of NDA. With the current strength of over [REDACTED] air force cadets per course in NDA, the recommendation to produce [REDACTED] pilots annually is achievable.

INSTRUCTOR PILOTS

77. Instructor pilot selection should be based on aptitude both in academics and flying for first assignment IPs. Similarly, those that have shown steady

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progress in their flying career could also be considered. However, all selected IPs should undergo the same academic training through standardised syllabus. The Minimum Item File (MIF) should also be standardized regardless of aircraft type to be flown by the trainees. Taking into account attrition rate, other staff courses and postings, a total of [REDACTED] instructor pilots would need to be graduated annually to meet local training demand.

NAVIGATORS/FLIGHT ENGINEERS/LOAD MASTERS

78. There are [REDACTED] navigators in the Service with most of them deployed to desk jobs. However, [REDACTED] would be required to man the [REDACTED] in NAF inventory up to the year 2026. There is a shortfall of [REDACTED] Navigators required to be trained by 2026. There are [REDACTED] loadmasters currently in the NAF, however, [REDACTED] are required to man the [REDACTED] to be in service by 2026. This leaves a shortfall of [REDACTED] loadmasters. There are no schools that conduct training for navigators, flight engineers and loadmasters in-country at present. Due to the small number required it will not be cost effective to establish in-house schools, the NAF should continue to train these set of aircrew in foreign institutions. The NAF would therefore need to consider training [REDACTED] Navigators, flight engineers and loadmasters each annually overseas for the next 10 years to be able to bridge the gap.

AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS

79. The NAF currently has a total of [REDACTED] ATCOs and [REDACTED] ATCAs/Base

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Operators. These numbers are inadequate to provide the requisite air traffic control services to cover NAF operations. With the envisaged expansion of the NAF, the integration of own military radars with the civil TRACON and the requirement to provide sufficient numbers of licensed ATCOs/ATCAs to cover Operation SECOND ELEVEN, the NAF would need to increase the number of ATCOs to [REDACTED] and ATCA/Base Ops to [REDACTED]. This gives a shortfall of [REDACTED] ATCOs and [REDACTED] ATCAs/Base Ops. This would require training at least [REDACTED] officers and [REDACTED] airmen/airwomen annually for the ATC specialty.

80. ATC courses are currently being conducted at the Nigerian College of Aviation Technology (NCAT) which has the capacity to train up to [REDACTED] personnel annually for the NAF. However, NCAT has proven over the years to be unreliable as courses that are supposed to last 9 to 12 months sometimes take up to 36 months to be completed. This has had negative impact on the career planning and deployment of the officers concerned. To overcome this challenge, it is proposed that the NAF's Air Traffic Training Wing (ATTW) at [REDACTED] [REDACTED] be upgraded to a training centre to accommodate the training of ATCOs and other ATS specialties. To facilitate the establishment of the ATC training centre, the NAF would need to secure Approved Training Organization (ATO) certification from NCAA and also acquire an ATC simulator. The training of the airmen/airwomen is currently being conducted at ATTW which has the capacity to train up to [REDACTED] ATCAs/Base Ops per year. This should be able to meet the requirement of the NAF. The estimated cost of the ATC simulator

is [REDACTED]

METEOROLOGISTS

81. There are currently [REDACTED] meteorologists and [REDACTED] met assistants in the NAF. Meanwhile, the NAF would require at least [REDACTED] meteorologists and [REDACTED] met assistants by 2026 to provide adequate meteorological services and instructional capabilities for the Service. This leaves a shortfall of [REDACTED] meteorologists and [REDACTED] met assistants. Making provisions for personnel turnover during the 10-year period of the strategic plan, a yearly enlistment and recruitment of at least [REDACTED] meteorologists and [REDACTED] met assistants would be required to address this gap.

82. The current approach of enlisting meteorologists through the Direct Short Service Commission (DSSC) scheme could be maintained. However, care must be taken to ensure that only graduates of meteorology that are practically ready for deployment, and not related courses like climatology, geography and others who will need extensive retraining to become operational are enlisted. This provision notwithstanding, NDA graduates of Physics or Mathematics interested in the meteorology specialty could be given the Class [REDACTED] Meteorologist's training at the Nigerian Meteorological Training Institute, Oshodi, Lagos. The training of the [REDACTED] met assistants annually can be accommodated and continued at the Meteorological Training Institute, Oshodi. Orientation course and other advance courses could be conducted for the enlisted DSSC meteorologists at the

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proposed Air Traffic Services Training Centre.

FIRE FIGHTING

83. *The NAF currently has only █ fire safety officers and █ firemen/women. This number is inadequate to meet the required manning of NAF operational and non-operational fire safety needs. The Service would require █ officers and █ airmen/airwomen to meet the operational needs of the Service by 2026. This leaves a shortfall of █ officers and █ airmen/airwomen for this NAF specialty. In order to breach this gap while making provisions for turnover of personnel arising from the disengagement from Service of some of those currently serving, the NAF would need to enlist and recruit at least █ officers and █ airmen/airwomen respectively annually.*

84. *The Federal Fire Academy, Sheda, FCT where NAF fire personnel are currently being trained has the capacity to train about █ NAF fire personnel per year. This school should be encouraged to continue to render these services to the NAF. This could however be augmented with training abroad.*

AIR INTELLIGENCE

85. *The current strength of personnel in DAI stands at █ officers and █ airmen/airwomen as against the required strength of █ officers and █ men. This gives a short fall of █ officers and █ men presently. To make up for this short fall, the NAF would have to enlist/recruit at least █ officers and █ airmen annually. This will cater for the newly created establishments and other*

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tri-service demands. Furthermore, the problem of specialist training for DAI personnel was intended to be addressed with the establishment of NAFSAINT. However, the school is deficient in many aspects of intelligence training particularly for officers. Hence, suitable training slots could be sought from Nigeria's strategic partners abroad, to train personnel in required aspects like GEOINT, IMINT and analysis. There is therefore need to sustain overseas specialist training for at least █ Intelligence officers annually to bridge the skill deficiency gap in the Directorate. Equipping NAFSAINT to be able to adequately handle the specialist manpower training of the directorate is also essential.

REGIMENT

86. There are █ Regiment officers and █ airmen currently in the NAF as against the proposed manpower requirement of █ officers and █ airmen/airwomen. This disposition falls short of Service requirement for regiment by █ offrs and █ airmen/airwomen, against the increasing need for force protection and Special Forces to contain the emerging in-country and global terrorist challenges. The NAF would need to train █ officers and █ airmen/airwomen annually to meet the manpower needs of this specialty. With adequate intake of Regt personnel, the NAF would bridge existing gaps by enhanced training at the RTC as well as collaborating with sister Services and Nigeria's foreign partners.

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AIRCRAFT ENGINEERING

87. There are [REDACTED] engineering officers and [REDACTED] technicians as against [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] officers and technicians required by the NAF. This leaves a shortfall of [REDACTED] engineering offrs and [REDACTED] technicians. Most of the experienced technicians have less than [REDACTED] years left in the Service. Additionally, due to the security situation in the country, a sizeable number of NAF technicians are deployed for various IS operations and many of the very experienced hands are WOs and MWOs. From this pool of engineers and technicians, the concept of Standard Deployable Force (SDF) cannot be achieved. However, with the full induction of the [REDACTED], this would free [REDACTED] personnel for their specialist functions. Notwithstanding, it is necessary that deliberate recruitment be undertaken for engineers and technicians to fill the existing gap. At least [REDACTED] offrs and [REDACTED] airmen/airwomen would be required annually.

88. [REDACTED] currently trains about [REDACTED] technicians annually and can only produce [REDACTED] men at this pace in 10 years. Hence, the need to expand [REDACTED] capacity for initial/basic training if the gap of [REDACTED] technicians is to be bridged by 2026. There is need to enlist more DSSC offrs for engineering specialties.

ARMAMENT

89. In the Armament specialty, there are [REDACTED] officers and [REDACTED] airmen currently in the NAF as against [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] officers/men required. Thus, a gap

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of [REDACTED] offrs and [REDACTED] men do exist. The major manning challenge for the specialty is paucity of intake of offrs and men. Currently, the average intake is [REDACTED] offrs per year. This would need to be reviewed upward to [REDACTED] offrs annually. Similarly, the average intake of [REDACTED] airmen/airwomen should be revised to [REDACTED] annually to bridge the existing gaps over the next 10 years. Majority of the armament personnel are trained only on basic armament. There is therefore the need for in-depth training of more armament personnel.

LOGISTICS

90. The Logistics specialty is projected for [REDACTED] officers and [REDACTED] airmen/airwomen. However, the present personnel strength stands at [REDACTED] officers and [REDACTED] airmen/airwomen. There is therefore a shortfall of [REDACTED] officers and [REDACTED] airmen/airwomen respectively. AFIT currently conducts basic training for log personnel. The institute has capacity to train [REDACTED] streams of [REDACTED] offrs and [REDACTED] streams of [REDACTED] airmen/airwomen, amounting to [REDACTED] offrs and [REDACTED] men per annum. However, personnel intake is not adequately available to match this capacity. There is therefore the need to increase the numbers of personnel allotted to logistics during enlistments and recruitments over the next 10 years.

COMMUNICATIONS

91. The communications specialty is staffed with [REDACTED] officers and [REDACTED] airmen/airwomen as against the established strength of [REDACTED] officers and [REDACTED]

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airmen/airwomen. The specialty is expected to cater for all NAF communication centres, operations rooms, radar sites, nav aids equipment, airborne tactical observers and surveillance, workshop/duty technicians, telephone technicians, ICT staff and contribute extensively to R&D in the NAF. Currently, there is a shortfall of [REDACTED] officers and [REDACTED] airmen/airwomen. The basic intake for airmen/airwomen is through candidates with trade test certificates in electronics engineering or “Non Trade” personnel with science background who attend the basic comms/radar training at Air Force Institute of Technology, (AFIT). The officers on the other hand come in through NDA or DSSC with HND or BSc in Electronics Engineering/Telecommunications or similar background. To bridge the gap in manning, the communications specialty would require enlistment and recruitment of [REDACTED] officers and [REDACTED] airmen/airwomen respectively every year for the next [REDACTED] years. Upgrading of these personnel is conducted at the Electrical and Electronics Engineering Department in AFIT while other manpower developments are conducted at Universities such as Obafemi Awolowo University, Ife and Cranfield University, UK.

RADAR

92. The Radar Specialty is currently staffed with [REDACTED] officers and [REDACTED] techs as against the established strength of [REDACTED] officers and [REDACTED] techs. The specialty is expected to cater for the maintenance of all NAF radar, nav aids, airfield lighting systems, control tower equipment and conduct of electronic warfare in the NAF. Currently, there is a shortfall of 81 officers and [REDACTED] technicians. The basic

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intake for airmen/airwomen is through candidates with trade test certificate in Electronics Maintenance or “Non-Trades” personnel with Science background as well as those who have attended courses in EE/Radar. The officers, on the other hand, are through NDA RC training and DSSC for graduates with HND or BSc in Electronics Engineering or related field. To bridge the gap in manning, the Radar specialty would require enlistment and recruitment of █ officers and █ airmen/airwomen respectively annually for the next 10 years. Upgrading of these personnel would be conducted at AFIT while specialist training will be conducted on specific equipment locally or overseas.

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY

93. The IT specialty is staffed with █ officers and █ airmen/airwomen as against the established strength of █ officers and █ airmen/airwomen. The specialty is expected to cater for all NAF IT platforms and IT slots in Tri-Service institutions. Currently, the directorate has a shortfall of █ officers and █ airmen/airwomen intake annually. The intake requirements for airmen/airwomen are those with Diploma qualifications in computer related courses. Intake for officers is through candidates with HND or BSc qualification in computer related courses are enlisted. The NAF does not have an in-house school for manpower development thus rely on qualified candidates for enlistment/recruitment for officers and airmen/airwomen respectively. To bridge the manpower shortage, the NAF would need to enlist about 24 DSSC officers and recruit █ airmen/airwomen annually for the next 10 years.

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WORKS

94. The works Specialty is staffed with [REDACTED] officers and [REDACTED] airmen/airwomen. The establishment strength of works department is [REDACTED] officers and [REDACTED] airmen/airwomen. This leaves a shortfall of [REDACTED] officers and [REDACTED] airmen/airwomen which need to be filled. The intake for works officers is through the NDA with BSc Civil Engineering and DSSC with HND or BSc in Works-related fields while the airmen/airwomen is through the regular recruitment process either as Non-trade or those with trade test certificates in works-related trades. The specialty receives from NDA [REDACTED] officers (Civil Engineering) while the rest of the specialty is secured through DSSC enlistment. Training and upgrading of officers and airmen/airwomen are conducted at AFIT. Additionally, courses are also obtained at the Ministry of Labour and Productivity for the initial training and upgrading of works personnel. Accordingly, [REDACTED] officers and [REDACTED] airmen/airwomen would need to be engaged annually to bridge the manpower gaps.

ADMIN/PERSONNEL

95. The Admin/Personnel specialty requires a strength of [REDACTED] officers and [REDACTED] airmen/airwomen. However, the present personnel strength stands at [REDACTED] officers and [REDACTED] airmen/airwomen leaving a shortfall of [REDACTED] officers and [REDACTED] airmen/airwomen. The NAF trains [REDACTED] streams of about [REDACTED] officers and [REDACTED] airmen/airwomen annually for IPAMOC/IBCC in School of

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Administration (SOA). Therefore, at the rate of [REDACTED] officers and [REDACTED] airmen/airwomen annually, the NAF could train a total of [REDACTED] officers and [REDACTED] airmen/airwomen by 2026. Accordingly, there is need to increase capacity at the SOA and equally seek for alternative approach to train the junior cadre. This will require improved collaborations with sister Services, ASCON, FTCs and exploring training opportunities available abroad to achieve the objectives to meet the manpower requirement in the next 10 years, at least [REDACTED] additional airmen/airwomen would need to be annually recruited and trained.

AIR PROVOST

96. The Air Police has an established strength of [REDACTED] officers and [REDACTED] airmen/airwomen. However, the current manpower disposition is [REDACTED] officers and [REDACTED] airmen/airwomen leaving a shortfall of [REDACTED] officers and [REDACTED] airmen/airwomen. The specialty would require [REDACTED] officers and [REDACTED] airmen/airwomen to be enlisted and recruited annually for the next 10 years to fill the existing vacancies. The Air Police School in Kaduna is capable of training [REDACTED] officers and [REDACTED] airmen/airwomen annually. The Service also trains their personnel at DSS School at Kaduna and Lagos and the Police schools in Enugu and Jos. The services being provided by these two institutions are capable of meeting the manpower training needs of the NAF if exploited.

MEDICAL

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97. The NAF requires [REDACTED] officers and [REDACTED] airmen/airwomen as medical personnel. However, the current manpower disposition comprises [REDACTED] officers and [REDACTED] airmen/airwomen leaving a shortfall of [REDACTED] officers and [REDACTED] airmen/airwomen. At the point of entry, medical personnel are absorbed into the Service as trained specialists from different fields in medical sciences. This intake through DSSC and recruitment is enough to stultify/satisfy the manpower requirement of the medical specialty. However, further professional training of personnel would be conducted at certified civil institutions, Nigerian Army School of Medical Sciences, Ojo, Lagos and the Nigerian Air Force School of Medical Sciences, Kaduna to provide the requisite manpower.

PUBLIC RELATIONS/INFORMATION

98. The manpower requirement for DOPRI is projected for [REDACTED] officers and [REDACTED] airmen/airwomen. Currently, the Directorate has a posted strength of 44 officers and [REDACTED] airmen/airwomen leaving a shortfall of [REDACTED] officers and [REDACTED] airmen/airwomen. Thus, there is the need to enlist and recruit at least [REDACTED] officers and [REDACTED] airmen/airwomen annually for the next [REDACTED] years to meet the manning requirement for the Directorate. The NAF does not have its own PR/Info training school thus rely on NASPRI for its manpower development. Additionally, the NAF also leverage the services of Nigerian Institute of Journalism, Lagos and International Institute of Journalism, Abuja for its manpower development. This should be continued.

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LEGAL

99. The Legal Department has an established strength of █ officers and █ airmen/airwomen. However, the specialty has █ officers and █ airmen/airwomen leaving a shortfall of █ officers and █ airmen/airwomen. The Department attracts its personnel through the DSSC enlistment for officers and recruitment of law diplomas of airmen/airwomen. The air force does not have in-house manpower development institute for legal officers hence they rely on already qualified personnel for enlistment. Therefore, enlistment of █ lawyers and █ legal clerks annually for the next 10 years would beef up their strengths.

EDUCATION

100. The Education Specialty is staffed with █ officers and █ airmen/airwomen as against the established strength of █ officers and █ airmen/airwomen. The Specialty is expected to cater for the NAF Nursery, Primary, Secondary, NDA, AFIT, GTC and the Tri-Service Institutions. There is a shortfall of █ officers and █ airmen/airwomen. The basic intake for airmen/airwomen is through the recruitment of those with NCE/non-trade while the officers are enlisted through DSSC and must have degree in Education or PGDE/NCE. To bridge the gap in manning, the education specialty would require enlistment and recruitment of █ officers and █ airmen/airwomen annually for the next 10 years. At present, the upgrading of these personnel is

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conducted through short courses at Army College of Education, Ilorin and the Nigerian Universities. This should be continued.

PHYSICAL EDUCATION/SPORTS

101. The Physical Education (PE)/Sports Specialty is staffed with ■ officers and ■ airmen/airwomen as against the manning requirement of ■ officers and ■ airmen/airwomen. The specialty is expected to cater for NAF Sports and fitness training of officers and airmen/airwomen. Currently, the PE/Sports Specialty have a shortfall of ■ officers and ■ airmen/airwomen. The basic intake for airmen/airwomen is through the NAF annual recruitment exercises while the officers are through DSSC with BSc or HND in physical and health education. To bridge the gap in manning, the PE/Sports Specialty would require enlistment and recruitment of ■ officers and ■ airmen/airwomen respectively annually for the next 10 years.

CHAPLAIN/IMAM

102. The NAF manpower disposition for Chaplain/Imam comprises ■ chaplains, ■ Assistant; ■ Imams and ■ Assistant Imams to man existing worship centres. However, the manning requirement consists of 48 Chaplains, ■ Assistant Chaplains, ■ Imams and ■ Imam Assistants. This leaves shortfall of ■ Chaplains and ■ Imams as well as ■ Assistant Chaplains and ■ Assistant Imams. The Chaplaincy and Imams enlisted through DSSC while the airmen/airwomen are through the normal recruitment

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process. The chaplains and Imams are qualified before they enlisted as there are no in-house schools for their training. However, the airmen/airwomen gain entry through the recruitment process. The shortfall in manning could be address through enlistment of █ chaplains and █ Imams yearly for the next █ years. The airmen/airwomen could be addressed through the recruitment of █ and █ assistant chaplains and Imams respectively.

MUSIC

103. There are █ officers and █ airmen/airwomen in the music specialty as against █ officers and █ airmen/airwomen. This translates to a shortfall of █ officers and █ airmen/airwomen. The NAF has a school of music in Kaduna and do leverage the Nigerian army school of music for manpower development. The enlistment of █ officers and recruitment of █ airmen/airwomen yearly for the next 10 years would bridge the manning gaps.

CATERING

104. The Catering Specialty is staffed with █ officers and █ airmen/airwomen as against the required strength of █ officers and █ airmen/airwomen. The specialty is expected to cater for the NAF Hospitals, Air Force Boarding Schools, AFIT, GTC and the Tri-Service institutions as well as those deployed in operational areas. Currently, they have a shortfall of █ officers and █ airmen/airwomen. The basic intake for airmen/airwomen is through those with trade test certificate in catering and hotel management while the officers are

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through DSSC with HND or BSc in Catering or Hospitality Management. To bridge the gap in manning the catering specialty would require enlistment and recruitment of █ officers and █ airmen/airwomen yearly for the next 10 years. Upgrading of these personnel is conducted at Nigerian Army Catering School Benin and the National Institute for Hospitality Management and Tourism Wuse, Abuja.

ACCOUNTS AND BUDGET

105. The NAF requires █ personnel in the Accounts and Budget specialty comprising █ officers and █ airmen/airwomen. However, there are currently █ officers and █ airmen/airwomen in the specialty. This represents a shortfall of █ officers and █ airmen/airwomen. Offrs enlist into the specialty through NDA and for civilian graduates with BSc or HND degree in finance/account related fields through DSSC, while civilians with ordinary diploma in account/finance fields are recruited as airmen/airwomen. The Nigerian Air Force School of Finance and Accounts at Badagry and the Nigerian Army School of Finance Ojo currently train personnel of the specialty at different levels for the NAF. The accounts and budget speciality would require the enlistment and recruitment of █ officers and █ airmen/airwomen respectively annually for the next 10 years.

MANPOWER SUMMARY

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106. The foregoing analysis of manpower requirements deduced that the NAF requires [REDACTED] officers and [REDACTED] airmen/airwomen to conduct her activities up to 2026 as detailed at Annex K. There are currently [REDACTED] officers and [REDACTED] airmen/airwomen in the NAF. This leaves a shortfall of [REDACTED] officers and [REDACTED] airmen/airwomen that would need to be enlisted or recruited in phases over the next 10 years as detailed at Annex L. This will translate to enlistment of [REDACTED] officers yearly. However, with annual intake of approximately [REDACTED] cadets through NDA, it would be impossible to meet the officer requirement for the planned period. Consequently, there would be need to prevail on appropriate authority to increase NDA intake and revisit the cadet military training course (CMTC) concept. Additionally, enlistment through the DSSC programme could be considered for non-core trades such as pay, medical, education, public relations/information, legal, sports, chaplain, imam, music, catering, works, information technology, meteorologists, fire etc to meet the shortfall in manpower. For the airmen/airwomen category the current annual recruitment of [REDACTED] airmen/airwomen translates to intake of [REDACTED] for 10 years. This, if sustained is considered sufficient to meet the requirement for the period under review.

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CHAPTER 6

IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

107. Having identified the strategic issues and goals that will guide NAF operations until 2026, it is necessary to outline the implementation plan which is critical to the success of the strategic plan. The implementation plan is divided into 3 phases:

- a. Phase 1: 2017 – 2020.
- b. Phase 2: 2020 – 2022.
- c. Phase 3: 2023 – 2026.

The phased implementation plan covering policies, aircraft and equipment acquisition are as detailed in Tables 6 - 8 while the plan for abridging the manpower deficiency for all specialties are as shown in Table 9. Notwithstanding, there are activities that are common to all phases such as collaboration with civil institutions for R&D, training and maintenance.

PHASE 1

108. In Phase 1, the first year is dedicated to addressing policy issues. This is with a view to providing the necessary framework for subsequent years. Details of the projected activities for Phase 1 and the desired goals are as shown in Table 6.

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TABLE 6: PHASE 1 (2017 - 2020) IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

Serial (a)	Time Frame (b)	Activity (c)	Goals (d)
1.	2017	<i>Establish an implementation ctee for the strategic plan.</i>	<i>To drive the implementation of the strategic plan.</i>
2.		<i>Institute a ctee to rationalise existing aircraft platforms.</i>	<i>To enhance logistics management of the entire fleet.</i>
3.		[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
4.		<i>Establish a ctee to find a replacement for A-Jet/G-222.</i>	<i>Gradual Phase out of A-Jet and decommissioning of G-222.</i>
5.		<i>Commence acquisition process for all new ac types.</i>	<i>Towards induction of new ac types and enhancement of operational efficiency.</i>
6.		<i>Establish a ctee for restructuring of HQ NAF.</i> <i>Unbundling of TC into 2 Commands.</i>	<i>- Adjustment of the Admin Branch to create Medical Services Branch.</i> <i>- Upgrade of sports, Chaplaincy/ Imam to Directorates, Establishment of Legal Management Group.</i> <i>- Establishment of Air Training Command and Ground Training Command to enhance training in the NAF.</i>
7.		[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
8.		[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
9.		<i>Train more UAV pilots and engineers.</i>	<i>To enhance operations.</i>

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(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	
10.	2018 - 2020	[REDACTED]	Upgrade and installation of ATC equipment.	
11.		Construction of barrack accommodation.	To meet [REDACTED] per cent of barrack accommodation deficiency.	
12.		Provision of hangar equipment in line with Annex D.	To ensure Test Benches and other support equipment are in place.	
13.		[REDACTED]	To enhance surveillance capabilities.	
14.		[REDACTED]	To enhance force protection.	
15.		[REDACTED]	To enhance SAR and CASEVAC capability.	
16.		[REDACTED]	To enhance operational capability.	
17.		[REDACTED]	To augment existing fire tenders.	
18.		[REDACTED]	To enhance operations in unfounded air bases.	
19.		Construct BFIs [REDACTED]	To enhance hitch free operations.	
19.		Acquisition of communications support equipment in line with Annex F.	To enhance effective communication.	
20.		[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	
21.		Construct ammo depot and acquire weapons and ammunitions in line with Annex H.	To enhance force protection.	
22.		Construction of military taxiways and aprons [REDACTED]	To enhance NAF ac operations and protection in these bases.	
23.		Acquisition of force protection and base defence equipment.	To enhance security of NAF bases.	
24.		[REDACTED]	To enhance operations in unfounded bases.	
25.		Induction of newly acquired ac types.	To ensure air capability and operations.	
26.		2020	Evaluation of Phase 1 plan.	To monitor the implementation process towards the attainment of the objectives of Phase 1.

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PHASE 2

109. Phase 2 covers the period 2021 - 2023. Phase 2 implementation would be predicated on the success of Phase 1. However, details of the projected activities and goals for Phase 2 are as shown in Table 7.

TABLE 7: PHASE 2 (2021 - 2023) IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

Serial (a)	Milestone (b)	Activity (c)	Goals (d)
1.	2021 - 2023	Continue provisioning of hangar equipment in line with Annex D.	To ensure Test Benches and other support equipment are in place.
2.		[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
3.		[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
4.		Acquire and install GIS lab and its associated equipment.	To enhance Int gathering capability.
5.		Construction of additional barrack accommodation.	To meet [REDACTED] per cent of barrack accommodation deficiency.
6.		[REDACTED]	To enhance operations in unfounded air bases. To enhance hitch free operations.
7.		Acquire additional communications support equipment in line with Annex F.	To enhance inter unit communications and intelligence gathering.
8.		Acquire additional IT equipment [REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
9.		[REDACTED]	To ensure safety of arms and ammunitions.
10.		Acquisition of additional force protection and base defence equipment	To enhance base security
11.		Induction of newly acquired ac types.	To enhance air capability.
12.		Conclude actions on non-performing contracts relating to aircraft PDM.	To maximise use of NAF resources.

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(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
13.	2021 - 2023	<i>Decommissioning of A-Jet and G-222.</i>	<i>Achieve ac rationalisation.</i>
14.	2023	<i>Evaluation of Phase 2 plan.</i>	<i>To monitor the implementation process towards the attainment of objectives of Phase 2.</i>

PHASE 3

110. Phase 3 covers the period 2024 - 2026. The period will be dedicated to complete induction of all new aircraft types and their support systems, consolidation of operations, maintenance and training. The details of the projected activities and goals are as shown in Table 8.

TABLE 8: PHASE 3 (2024 - 2026) IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

Serial	Time Frame	Activity	Goals
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
1.	2024 - 2026	<i>Conclude provisioning of hangar equipment in line with Annex D.</i>	<i>To ensure Test Benches and other support equipment are in place.</i>
2.		<i>Construction of barrack accommodation.</i>	<i>To meet █ per cent of barrack accommodation deficiency.</i>
3.		<i>Acquire remaining █ Portable Fuel Bowsers.</i>	<i>To enhance operations in unfounded air bases.</i>
4.		<i>Acquire remaining communications support equipment in line with Annex F.</i>	<i>To enhance effective communications.</i>
5.		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - █ - █ - █ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>To provide necessary support for air operations.</i> - <i>For example ILS: To enhance air safety.</i> - <i>To ensure air safety and operations.</i>

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(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
6.	2024 - 2026	Acquire remaining IT equipment for base protection and surveillance in line with Annex G.	To establish Tactical operating centres for commands and enhance data management.
7.		Completion of ammo depot construction and acquisition of remaining weapons and ammunitions in line with Annex H.	[REDACTED]
8.		Induction of newly acquired ac types.	To enhance air power capabilities.
9.	2026	Evaluation of Phase 3 strategic plan and report on the strategic plan.	To monitor the implementation strategies and attainment of objectives.
		Set-up ctee for 2027 - 2036 Strategic Plan.	To draw up 2027-2036 Strategic Plan

MANPOWER DEFICIENCY MANAGEMENT

111. To allow for adequate manning, manpower deficiency will not be phased, rather it would be managed on annual basis. Table 9 outline the annual personnel training need for the various air force specialties. Hence, a total of [REDACTED] officers and [REDACTED] airmen/airwomen would be required to be enlisted and recruited into the NAF by 2026 as detailed at Annex L.

TABLE 9: ANNUAL TRAINING REQUIREMENTS TO MEET MANPOWER DEFICIENCIES

Serial	Trade	Training Projections	
		Officers	Airmen/Airwomen
(a)	(b)	[REDACTED]	(d)
1.	Pilots	[REDACTED]	-
2.	Navigators	[REDACTED]	-
3.	UAV Operators	[REDACTED]	-
4.	Loadmasters	[REDACTED]	2
5.	Air Traffic Controllers	[REDACTED]	22
6.	Meteorologists	[REDACTED]	10
7.	Fire	[REDACTED]	151
8.	Air Intelligence	[REDACTED]	55

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(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
9.	<i>Regiment</i>		
10.	<i>Aircraft Engineering</i>		
11.	<i>Armament</i>		
12.	<i>Logistics</i>		
13.	<i>Communications</i>		
14.	<i>Radar</i>		
15.	<i>Info Tech</i>		
16.	<i>Works</i>		
17.	<i>Admin/Personnel</i>		
18.	<i>Air Provost</i>		
19.	<i>Medical</i>		
20.	<i>Public Relations/Info</i>		
21.	<i>Legal</i>		
22.	<i>Education</i>		
23.	<i>Sports</i>		
24.	<i>Chaplain</i>		
25.	<i>Imam</i>		
26.	<i>Music</i>		
27.	<i>Catering</i>		
28.	<i>Accounts & Budget</i>		
29.	Total		

FINANCIAL IMPLEMENTATION FOR THE PLAN

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Annexes:

- A. Capability to Platforms Matching.*
- B. Financial Requirements for Acquisition of Platforms and Cost of Integrated Logistics Systems, Upgrades and Periodic Depot Maintenance.*
- C. Nav aids and Radar Requirements.*
- D. Hangar Equipment Requirements.*
- E. Logistics Depot Requirements.*
- F. Communications Equipment Requirements.*
- G. Information Technology Equipment Requirements.*

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- H. Armament and Armament Depot Requirements.*
- I. Force Protection Equipment Requirements.*
- J. Medical Equipment Requirements.*
- K. Current NAF Manpower Disposition.*
- L. Manpower Deficiency - Enlistment/Recruitment and Training Plan 2017 - 2026*
- M. Development Plan for Acquisition of Platforms.*
- N. Summary of Capital Expenditure Requirements for the Strategic Period.*
- O. Projection for NAF Recurrent Expenditure 2017 - 2026.*

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